Affective Decision Making in Insurance Markets
This paper suggests incorporating affective considerations into decision making theory and insurance decision in particular. I describe a decision maker with two internal accounts - the rational account and the mental account. The rational account decides on insurance to maximize expected (perceived) utility, while the mental account chooses risk perceptions which then affect the perceived expected utility. The two accounts interact to reach a decision which is composed of both risk perception and insurance level. The model is based on psychology research and shows interesting results for the insurance markets. Also, this framework helps to distinguish between report and choice tasks.
|Date of creation:||01 Jan 2004|
|Date of revision:||01 Sep 2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://icf.som.yale.edu/|
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