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Capital Regulation, Liquidity Requirements and Taxation in a Dynamic Model of Banking

Author

Listed:
  • : Gianni De Nicolo
  • Andrea Gamba
  • Marcella Lucchetta

Abstract

This paper formulates a dynamic model of a bank exposed to both credit and liquidity risk, which can resolve financial distress in three costly forms: fire sales, bond issuance and equity issuance. We use the model to analyze the impact of capital regulation, liquidity requirements and taxation on banks' optimal policies and metrics of efficiency of intermediation and social value. We obtain three main results. First, mild capital requirements increase bank lending, bank efficiency and social value relative to an unregulated bank, but these benefits turn into costs if capital requirements are too stringent. Second, liquidity requirements reduce bank lending, efficiency and social value significantly, they nullify the benifits of mild capital requirements, and their private and social costs increase monotonically with their stringency. Third, increases in corporate income and bank liabilities taxes reduce bank lending, bank effciency and social value, with tax receipts increasing with the former but decreasing with the latter. Moreover, the effects of an increase in both forms of taxation are dampened if they are jointly implemented with increases in capital and liquidity requirements.
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Suggested Citation

  • : Gianni De Nicolo & Andrea Gamba & Marcella Lucchetta, 2012. "Capital Regulation, Liquidity Requirements and Taxation in a Dynamic Model of Banking," Working Papers wpn12-04, Warwick Business School, Finance Group.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbs:wpaper:wpn12-04
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gazi Kara & S. Mehmet Ozsoy, 2016. "Bank regulation under fire sale externalities," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-026, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Andreas Haufler & Ian Wooton, 2016. "Cross-Border Banking in Regulated Markets: Is Financial Integration Desirable?," CESifo Working Paper Series 6150, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Lakshmi Balasubramanyan, 2011. "The Impact of Concurrent Capital and Liquidity Requirements," NFI Working Papers 2011-WP-25, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    4. Popoyan, Lilit & Napoletano, Mauro & Roventini, Andrea, 2017. "Taming macroeconomic instability: Monetary and macro-prudential policy interactions in an agent-based model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 117-140.
    5. Natalie Tiernan & Pedro Gete, 2014. "Overlending and Macroprudential Tools," 2014 Meeting Papers 379, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Stijn Claessens, 2015. "An Overview of Macroprudential Policy Tools," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 397-422, December.
    7. Gunther Capelle-Blancard & Olena Havrylchyk, 2017. "Incidence of Bank Levy and Bank Market Power," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(3), pages 1023-1046.
    8. Cordella, Tito & Pienknagura, Samuel, 2013. "Macro prudential policies from a micro prudential angle," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6721, The World Bank.
    9. Gunther Capelle-Blancard & Olena Havrylchyk, 2014. "The burden of bank taxation: corporate income tax vs. bank levy," Chapters,in: Taxing Banks Fairly, chapter 4, pages 73-89 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Liu, Keqing, 2016. "Bank equity and macroprudential policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 1-17.
    11. Chaudhry, Sajid Mukhtar & Mullineux, Andrew & Agarwal, Natasha, 2015. "Balancing the regulation and taxation of banking," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 38-52.
    12. Buch, Claudia M. & Hilberg, Björn & Tonzer, Lena, 2016. "Taxing banks: An evaluation of the German bank levy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 52-66.
    13. Haufler, Andreas & Wooton, Ian, 2015. "Capital regulation and trade in banking services," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113056, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    14. de la Torre, Augusto & Ize, Alain, 2013. "The foundations of macroprudential regulation : a conceptual roadmap," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6575, The World Bank.
    15. Corbae, Dean & D'Erasmo, Pablo, 2014. "Capital requirements in a quantitative model of banking industry dynamics," Working Papers 14-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    16. Schmaltz, Christian & Pokutta, Sebastian & Heidorn, Thomas & Andrae, Silvio, 2014. "How to make regulators and shareholders happy under Basel III," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 311-325.
    17. Heidorn, Thomas & Buschmann, Christian, 2014. "The liquidity reserve funding and management strategies," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 210, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    18. Esa Jokivuolle & Ilkka Kiema & Timo Vesala, 2014. "Why Do We Need Countercyclical Capital Requirements?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 55-76, August.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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