Rock-Paper-Scissors and Cycle-Based Games
The present work characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium for games that are based on a cyclic preference relation. In the Nash equilibrium of these games, each player randomizes between three specific actions. In particular, an alternative way of deriving the unique Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game is proposed.
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- Philippe Robert-Demontrond & R. Ringoot, 2004. "Introduction," Post-Print halshs-00081823, HAL.
- A. van den Nouweland, 2007. "Rock-Paper-Scissors; A New and Elegant Proof," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1003, The University of Melbourne.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:43:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
- Anne van den Nouweland, 2007. "Rock-paper-scissors a new and elegant proof," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(43), pages 1-6.
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