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Rock-Paper-Scissors and Cycle-Based Games


  • Eric Bahel


The present work characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium for games that are based on a cyclic preference relation. In the Nash equilibrium of these games, each player randomizes between three specific actions. In particular, an alternative way of deriving the unique Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game is proposed.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Bahel, 2011. "Rock-Paper-Scissors and Cycle-Based Games," Working Papers e07-31, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:vpi:wpaper:e07-31

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Philippe Robert-Demontrond & R. Ringoot, 2004. "Introduction," Post-Print halshs-00081823, HAL.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:43:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Anne van den Nouweland, 2007. "Rock-paper-scissors a new and elegant proof," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(43), pages 1-6.
    4. A. van den Nouweland, 2007. "Rock-Paper-Scissors; A New and Elegant Proof," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1003, The University of Melbourne.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ɖura-Georg Granić & Johannes Kern, 2016. "Circulant games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(1), pages 43-69, January.
    2. Bahel, Eric & Haller, Hans, 2013. "Cycles with undistinguished actions and extended Rock–Paper–Scissors games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 588-591.
    3. Eric Bahel & Christian Trudeau, 2012. "Consistency Requirements and Pattern Methods in Cost Sharing Problems with Technological Cooperation," Working Papers e07-34, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item


    cycle; Nash equilibrium; prudent strategy;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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