IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/vpi/wpaper/e07-30.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Experimental Social Choice: The Impact of Nosy Preferences on Efficiency

Author

Listed:
  • Chetan Dave
  • Stefan Dodds
  • Sheryl Ball
  • Rachel Croson

Abstract

A foundational paradox in social choice theory is that liberalism (freedom of action) and Pareto efficiency, the standard in evaluating economic outcomes, can conflict with each other (Sen 1970). We capture this tension in a series of sequential Battle of the Sexes game experiments. We find that most individuals are willing to waive rights to achieve efficient outcomes. In addition efficiency is higher when participants may claim new rights than when they may relinquish them or when only one player possesses them. This evidence may help resolve the tensions between efficiency and liberty that lie at the heart of social choice and political philosophy.

Suggested Citation

  • Chetan Dave & Stefan Dodds & Sheryl Ball & Rachel Croson, 2011. "Experimental Social Choice: The Impact of Nosy Preferences on Efficiency," Working Papers e07-30, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:vpi:wpaper:e07-30
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: ftp://repec.econ.vt.edu/Papers/Ball/Social_Choice_and_BOS.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2010
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrew Postlewaite, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 255-262.
    2. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2011. "Groups, collective decisions and markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 275-299, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pareto Optimality; Sen’s Paradox; Social Choice; Minimal Liberalism; preferences; rights; Battle of the Sexes game Â;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vpi:wpaper:e07-30. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Djavad Salehi-Isfahani). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/decvtus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.