A Human Relations Paradox
We present a variant of a general equilibrium model with group formation to study how changes of non-consumptive beneï¬ ts from group formation impact on the well-being of group members. We identify a human relations paradox: Positive externalities increase, but none of the group members gains in equilibrium. Moreover, a member who experiences an increase of positive emotional beneï¬ ts in a group may become worse off in equilibrium.
|Date of creation:||2011|
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- Andrew Postlewaite, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 255-262.
- Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2011. "Groups, collective decisions and markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 275-299, January.
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