An n-country model of strategic emissions abatement: feedback strategies and cooperation
The present paper proposes a dynamic framework for the analysis of emissions abatement by different countries. Unlike many related works, it emphasizes the non-cooperative aspects of this issue. We derive the feedback Nash equilibrium as well as the cooperative emissions paths. Under the cooperative scenario, pollution is always lower: the international agency imposes lower emissions to the countries in early periods. Surprisingly enough, emissions might be higher in very distant periods under the cooperative scenario. A transfer scheme allowing to achieve global effciency is proposed.
|Date of creation:||2010|
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