On the Clock of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
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References listed on IDEAS
- Aytek Erdil & Paul Klemperer, 2010.
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More about this item
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-08-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CSE-2016-08-07 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-MIC-2016-08-07 (Microeconomics)
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