IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Occupation-specific immigration quotas in political equilibrium

Immigration policies are generally protectionist, yet positive immigration quotas often exist for workers in speci c occupations where the native labor supply is scarce. This paper determines occupation-speci c immigration quotas in a political economy framework with endogenous prices and compares them to the social optimum. It shows that positive quotas for speci c occupations can be the political outcome, even when total welfare e ects of immigration are negative. Two of the main ndings are that the (unique) voting outcome on immigration quotas is i) positive, if workers are immobile across occupations, and ii) negative (positive) for occupations where the native labor supply is suciently large (small), if workers are mobile across occupations.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie1207.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 1207.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Oct 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:1207
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Dixit Avinash & Rob Rafael, 1994. "Switching Costs and Sectoral Adjustments in General Equilibrium with Uninsured Risk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 48-69, February.
  2. Giovanni Facchini & Anna Maria Mayda, 2008. "From Individual Attitudes towards Migrants to Migration Policy Outcomes. Theory and Evidence," Development Working Papers 251, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano.
  3. Anna Maria Mayda, 2006. "Who Is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(3), pages 510-530, August.
  4. Zachariadis, Marios, 2012. "Immigration and international prices," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 298-311.
  5. George J. Borjas & Jeffrey Grogger & Gordon H. Hanson, 2012. "Comment: On Estimating Elasticities Of Substition," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 198-210, 02.
  6. Jim Dolmas & Gregory W. Huffman, 2004. "On The Political Economy Of Immigration And Income Redistribution," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1129-1168, November.
  7. Ortega, Francesc, 2005. "Immigration quotas and skill upgrading," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1841-1863, September.
  8. Facchini, Giovanni & Willmann, Gerald, 2005. "The political economy of international factor mobility," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 201-219, September.
  9. Paul W. Miller, 1999. "Immigration Policy and Immigrant Quality: The Australian Points System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 192-197, May.
  10. Tommaso Frattini, 2012. "Immigrazione," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, issue 3, pages 363-407, July-Sept.
  11. Donald R. Davis & David E. Weinstein, 2002. "Technological Superiority and the Losses from Migration," NBER Working Papers 8971, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Hillman, Arye L. & Weiss, Avi, 1999. "A theory of permissible illegal immigration," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 585-604, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:1207. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paper Administrator)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.