Ownership structure and control in incomplete market economies with transferable utility
We consider an economy with incomplete markets and a single ¯rm and assume that utility can be freely transferred in the form of the ini- tially available good 0 (quasilinearity). In this particularly simple and transparent framework, the objective of a firm can be defined as the max- imization of the total utility of its control group C measured in units of good 0. We analyze how the size and the composition of C influences the rm's market behavior and state conditions under which the firm sells its output at prices which are at, above, or below marginal costs, respectively. We discuss the assumption of competitive price perceptions and point out important differences between the concepts of a Dreze and of a Grossman- Hart equilibrium that occur in spite of the close similarity of the formulas which define them.
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- Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker, 2010. "Drèze equilibria and welfare maxima," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 45(1), pages 55-63, October.
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