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The Asset Market Game

This paper models asset markets as a game where assets pay according to an arbitrary payoff matrix,investors decide on fractions of wealth to allocate to each asset,and prices result from market clearing. The only pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is to split wealth proportionally to the assets´expected returns, which can be interpreted as investing according to the fundamentals. Further, the equilibrium is evolutionarily stable in the sense of Schaffer (1988). We also study the stability properties of the equilibrium in an evolutionary dynamics where wealth flows with higher probability into those strategies that obtain higher realized payoffs.

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Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 0320.

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Date of creation: Dec 2003
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Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:0320
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  1. Thorsten Hens & Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppé, 2003. "Evolutionary Stability of Portfolio Rules in Incomplete Markets," Discussion Papers 03-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  2. Ana B. Ania, 2000. "Learning by Imitation when Playing the Field," Vienna Economics Papers 0005, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  3. K. Schlag, 2010. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Levine's Working Paper Archive 454, David K. Levine.
  4. J. Bradford De Long & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, . "Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets," J. Bradford De Long's Working Papers _124, University of California at Berkeley, Economics Department.
  5. Carlos Alós Ferrer & Ana B. Ania, 2002. "The Evolutionary Logic of Feeling Small," Vienna Economics Papers 0216, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  6. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
  7. Martin Shubik, 1972. "A Theory of Money and Financial Institutions. Part IV. Fiat Money and Noncooperative Equilibrium in a Closed Economy," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 330, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  8. P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
  9. Fama, Eugene F, 1970. "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 25(2), pages 383-417, May.
  10. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  11. Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
  12. Brock, W.A. & Hommes, C.H., 1996. "Hetergeneous Beliefs and Routes to Chaos in a Simple Asset Pricing Model," Working papers 9621, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  13. Blume, Lawrence & Easley, David, 1992. "Evolution and market behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 9-40, October.
  14. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Ana Ania, 2005. "The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(3), pages 497-516, October.
  15. Kliger, Doron & Levy, Ori & Sonsino, Doron, 2003. "On absolute and relative performance and the demand for mutual funds--experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 341-363, November.
  16. Alan Kirman, 1993. "Ants, Rationality, and Recruitment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(1), pages 137-156.
  17. Hens, Thorsten & Reimann, Stefan & Vogt, Bodo, 2004. "Nash competitive equilibria and two-period fund separation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 321-346, June.
  18. Tanaka, Yasuhito, 2000. "A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an n players coordination game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 195-206, March.
  19. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(5), pages 937-68, October.
  20. Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, 1998. "Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(5), pages 1589-1622, October.
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