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Learning by Imitation when Playing the Field

We study the properties of learning rules based on imitation in the context of n-player games played among agents within the same population. We find that there are no (nontrivial) rules that increase (average) expected payoffs at each possible state, and for any possible game. The results highlight the complexity of learning by imitation of successful behavior displayed by conspecifics in the presence of strategic considerations within the same population.

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File URL: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0005.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 0005.

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Date of creation: Sep 2000
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Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:0005
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl

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  1. Pingle, Mark & Day, Richard H., 1996. "Modes of economizing behavior: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 191-209, March.
  2. Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999. "Learning in Cournot Oligopoly--An Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages C80-95, March.
  3. Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits," Discussion Paper Serie B 361, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1996.
  4. Hofbauer, Josef & Karl H. Schlag, . "Sophisticated Imitation in Cyclic Games," Discussion Paper Serie B 427, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1998.
  5. Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Ania, Ana B. & Schenk-Hoppe, Klaus Reiner, 2000. "An Evolutionary Model of Bertrand Oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-19, October.
  6. Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany.
  7. Schlag, Karl H., 1996. "Which one should I imitate?," Discussion Paper Serie B 365, University of Bonn, Germany.
  8. Conlisk, John, 1980. "Costly optimizers versus cheap imitators," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 275-293, September.
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