Learning, Memory, and Inertia
This paper explores the impact of memory in standard display imitation behavior, focusing on coordination games (as in Kandori et al (1993)) and N-player games where spiteful behavior allows to discard Nash equilibria. It is shown that the way interea is modeled in such examples actually entails a strong "no-memory" assumption. Once inertia is removed (or medeled otherwise), the addition of bounded memory changes the predictions dramatically. The analysis highlights the stability properties of Nash outcomes in purely evolutionary contexts with a finite population of agents.
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- Arthur J Robson & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1999.
"Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2112, David K. Levine.
- Robson, Arthur J. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1996. "Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 65-92, July.
- Rhode, Paul & Stegeman, Mark, 1996. "Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 443-49, March.
- Fernando Vega Redondo, 1996.
"The evolution of walrasian behavior,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
1996-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
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