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Eradicating women-hurting customs: What role for social engineering?

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  • Jean-Philippe Platteau
  • Guilia Camilotti
  • Emmanuelle Auriol

Abstract

Social engineering refers to deliberate attempts, often under the form of legislative moves, to promote changes in customs and norms that hurt the interests of marginalized population groups. This paper explores the analytical conditions under which social engineering is more or less likely to succeed than more indirect approaches when it comes to suppress genderbiased customs. This implies discussing the main possible interaction frameworks leading to antiwomen equilibria, and deriving policy implications from the corresponding games. The theoretical arguments are illustrated by examples drawn from available empirical works, thus providing a reasoned survey of the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Philippe Platteau & Guilia Camilotti & Emmanuelle Auriol, 2017. "Eradicating women-hurting customs: What role for social engineering?," WIDER Working Paper Series 145, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2017-145
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    1. repec:eee:deveco:v:127:y:2017:i:c:p:395-412 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2017. "Religious co-option in autocracy: A theory inspired by history," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 395-412.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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