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Political Clientelism and Capture: Theory and Evidence from West Bengal, India

  • Bardhan, Pranab
  • Mookherjee, Dilip

We provide a theory of political clientelism, which explains sources and determinants of political clientelism, the relationship between clientelism and elite capture, and their respective consequences for allocation of public services, welfare, and empir

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File URL: http://www.wider.unu.edu/stc/repec/pdfs/wp2012/wp2012-097.pdf
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Paper provided by World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) in its series Working Paper Series with number UNU-WIDER Research Paper WP2012/97.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2012-97
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  1. Khemani, Stuti, 2010. "Political capture of decentralization : vote-buying through grants-financed local jurisdictions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5350, The World Bank.
  2. Lori A. Beaman & Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo & Rohini Pande & Petia Topalova, 2008. "Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?," NBER Working Papers 14198, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
  4. Bardhan Pranab K. & Mookherjee Dilip & Parra Torrado Monica, 2010. "Impact of Political Reservations in West Bengal Local Governments on Anti-Poverty Targeting," Journal of Globalization and Development, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-38, January.
  5. Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, 2004. "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1409-1443, 09.
  6. Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1994. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," NBER Working Papers 4877, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Galasso, Emanuela & Ravallion, Martin, 2005. "Decentralized targeting of an antipoverty program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(4), pages 705-727, April.
  8. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
  9. Bardhan, Pranab & Mookherjee, Dilip, 2006. "Pro-poor targeting and accountability of local governments in West Bengal," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 303-327, April.
  10. Araujo, M. Caridad & Ferreira, Francisco H.G. & Lanjouw, Peter & Ozler, Berk, 2006. "Local inequality and project choice : theory and evidence from Ecuador," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3997, The World Bank.
  11. Priyanka Pandey, 2010. "Service Delivery and Corruption in Public Services: How Does History Matter?," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 190-204, July.
  12. Besley, Timothy J. & Pande, Rohini & Rao, Vijayendra, 2005. "Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India," CEPR Discussion Papers 5201, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Ghazala Mansuri, 2004. "Community-Based and -Driven Development: A Critical Review," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 19(1), pages 1-39.
  14. Ghazala Mansuri & Vijayendra Rao, 2013. "Localizing Development : Does Participation Work?," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 11859.
  15. Alessandro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, 2004. "Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform"," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(2), pages 705-763, May.
  16. Roland Benabou, 2000. "Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 96-129, March.
  17. Esther Duflo & Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, 2003. "The impact of reservation in the panchayati raj: Evidence from a nationwide randomized experiment," Framed Field Experiments 00223, The Field Experiments Website.
  18. Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
  19. Kochar, Anjini, 2008. "Schooling, wages and profits: Negative pecuniary externalities from schooling and their consequences for schooling investments," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 76-95, April.
  20. Timothy Besley & Rohini Pande & Lupin Rahman & Vijayendra Rao, 2004. "The Politics of Public Good Provision: Evidence from Indian Local Governments," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 416-426, 04/05.
  21. Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee (ed.), 2006. "Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262524546, June.
  22. Leonard Wantchekon, 2003. "Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in benin," Natural Field Experiments 00339, The Field Experiments Website.
  23. Dilip Mookherjee & Pranab K. Bardhan, 2000. "Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 135-139, May.
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