IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Regulatory Policy Design for Agroecosystem Management on Public Rangelands

  • Tigran Melkonyan

    ()

    (Department of Resource Economics, University of Nevada, Reno)

  • Michael Taylor

    ()

    (Department of Resource Economics, University of Nevada, Reno)

This paper analyzes regulatory design for agroecosystem management on public rangelands. We present an informational and institutional environment where three of the most prominent regulatory instruments on public rangelands – input regulation, cost-sharing/taxation, and performance regulation – can be defined and compared. The paper examines how the optimal regulation is shaped by the informational and institutional constraints faced by federal land management agencies (FLMAs) such as the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service. These constraints include informational asymmetries between ranchers and FLMAs, limitations on FLMAs’ ability to monitor ranch-level ecological conditions, and constraints on FLMAs’ actions due to budget limitations and restrictions on the level of penalties they can assess. The theoretical model extends the previous work of Baker (1992), Prendergast (2002), and Hueth and Melkonyan (2009) by considering optimal regulation by a budget-constrained regulator in an environment of asymmetric information and moral hazard.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.coba.unr.edu/econ/wp/papers/UNRECONWP10007.pdf
File Function: First version, 2010
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics & University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics in its series Working Papers with number 10-007.

as
in new window

Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:unr:wpaper:10-007
Contact details of provider: Postal: Mail Stop 030, Reno, NV 89557-0207
Phone: (775) 784-6450
Fax: (775) 784-4728
Web page: http://www.business.unr.edu/econ/

More information through EDIRC

Web page: http://www.cabnr.unr.edu/re/

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Havstad, Kris M. & Peters, Debra P.C. & Skaggs, Rhonda & Brown, Joel & Bestelmeyer, Brandon & Fredrickson, Ed & Herrick, Jeffrey & Wright, Jack, 2007. "Ecological services to and from rangelands of the United States," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 261-268, December.
  2. Axel Gautier, 2004. "Regulation under Financial Constraints," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 645-656, December.
  3. Johnson, Ronald N. & Watts, Myles J., 1989. "Contractual stipulations, resource use, and interest groups: Implications from federal grazing contracts," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 87-96, January.
  4. P. Bontems & J-M. Bourgeon, 2000. "Optimal Environmental Taxation and Enforcement Policy," THEMA Working Papers 2000-56, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  5. Jeffrey T. LaFrance & Myles J. Watts, 1995. "Public Grazing in the West and "Rangeland Reform '94"," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-46, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  6. Sheriff, Glenn, 2008. "Optimal environmental regulation of politically influential sectors with asymmetric information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 72-89, January.
  7. Xu, Feng & Mittelhammer, Ronald C. & Torell, L. Allen, 1994. "Modeling Nonnegativity Via Truncated Logistic And Normal Distributions: An Application To Ranch Land Price Analysis," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 19(01), July.
  8. Anthon, Signe & Bogetoft, Peter & Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark, 2007. "Socially optimal procurement with tight budgets and rationing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1625-1642, August.
  9. Keith, John E. & Lyon, Kenneth S., 1985. "Valuing Wildlife Management: A Utah Deer Herd," Western Journal of Agricultural Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 10(02), December.
  10. Rui R. Zhao, 2008. "All-or-Nothing Monitoring," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1619-28, September.
  11. Philippe Bontems & Gilles Rotillon & Nadine Turpin, 2005. "Self-Selecting Agri-environmental Policieswith an Application to the Don Watershed," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(3), pages 275-301, 07.
  12. Watts, Myles J. & Shimshack, Jay P. & LaFrance, Jeffrey T, 2006. "Grazing fees versus stewardship on federal lands," CUDARE Working Paper Series 1022, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
  13. Axel Gautier & Manipushpak Mitra, 2006. "Regulating a monopolist with limited funds," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 705-718, 04.
  14. Brent Hueth & Tigran Melkonyan, 2009. "Standards and the regulation of environmental risk," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 219-246, December.
  15. Feng, Hongli, 2007. "Green payments and dual policy goals," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 323-335, November.
  16. Bontems, Philippe & Thomas, Alban, 2006. "AJAE Appendix: Regulating Nitrogen Pollution with Risk-Averse Farmers under Hidden Information and Moral Hazard," American Journal of Agricultural Economics Appendices, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 88(1), February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unr:wpaper:10-007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mehmet Tosun)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.