A Class of Methods for Evaluating Multiattribute Utilities
A state, for instance a health state, is characterized by a number of attributes to each of which a level is assigned. A specific collection of numerical values, for instance utilities, for all possible states is called a situation. The main purpose of the paper is to develop a class of methods that assign, for a given situation, a numerical value to each possible level of each attribute, intended to measure the contribution of each such level to reaching the perfect state, in which each attribute has maximal level. The paper focuses on methods that share four properties: distribution, zero contribution, homogeneity, and the transfer property. All these methods have the propertyof marginalism: they measure the effect of lowering, ceteris paribus, a certain level by one. Within the class of methods so obtained, special attention is given to the so called egalitarian valuation, which treats lower and higher levels equally.
|Date of creation:||1999|
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- H Zank & M Joore & H Peters & L Anteunis & G Boas, 2002. "A New Index for the Evaluation of Health States and Health Programs," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0210, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Einy, Ezra, 1988. "The shapley value on some lattices of monotonic games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-10, February.
- Hsiao Chih-Ru & Raghavan T. E. S., 1993. "Shapley Value for Multichoice Cooperative Games, I," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 240-256, April.
- Faigle, U & Kern, W, 1992. "The Shapley Value for Cooperative Games under Precedence Constraints," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 249-66.
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