Nash-Bargained Consumption Decisions: A Revealed Preference Analysis
We present revealed preference characterisations of Nash-bargained consumption decisions in a two-player game. Our main analysis focuses on the symmetric Nash-bargaining solution with observed threat point bundles. However, we also present the testable implications of the generalised Nash-bargaining solution and the settings in which threat point bundles are not observed. We illustrate the practical usefulness of these conditions by means of an application to experimental data, which provides a first empirical test of the Nash-bargaining model on consumption data. © 2012 Royal Economic Society.
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|Date of creation:||Mar 2013|
|Publication status:||Published in: Economic journal (2013) v.123 n° 567,p.195-235|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: CP135, 50, avenue F.D. Roosevelt, 1050 Bruxelles|
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