Structural adjustment and endogenous worker recall probabilities
In this paper we investigate the incentives of unemployed workers to wait for a recall when recall probabilities are endogenously determined by the waiting decisions of others. Because of a positive externality that arise when workers seek new employment, an excessive number of workers choose to wait for a recall, and structural adjustment is slow. We also find that a small reduction in the unemployment benefits, or introducing a small cash bonus for workers that get a new job, may have no effect on unemployment in some cases, while eradicating significant levels of unemployment in other cases. Our analysis suggests that the government may face a Samaritan's Dilemma if it can influence the recall probability of workers, and that multiple equilibria may exist in a game involving both workers and an unemployment-averse government. Furthermore, we explore a link to the war of attrition literature, showing that the Bulow and Klemperer (1999) "one too many"-result may not hold if there is uncertainty concerning when the game ends.
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NBER Working Papers
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- Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1996. " A Multi-winner Nested Rent-Seeking Contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 177-84, April.
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