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Moral hazard and tradeable pollution emission permits

  • Francisco Álvarez

    (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI))

  • Ester Camiña

    (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI))

Analizamos el mercado de derechos de emisión en un entorno en el que la contaminación, generada a partir de la actividad productiva de las empresas, se determina como la suma de un shock específico de cada empresa y la decisión de las mismas sobre el esfuerzo que dedican a reducir la contaminación. En este escenario, una sociedad mazimizadora de la utilidad desea inducir el esfuerzo óptimo en cada empresa. Dado que este esfuerzo lo decide cada empresa y no lo observa el regulador medioambiental, nos encontramos con un problema de riesgo moral en el que: (i) las empresas (agentes) tienen una ventaja informacional con respecto al regulador (principal) y (ii) el único enlace entre las empresas contaminantes es el mercado de derechos de emisión, que es una manera de intercambiar derechos (contratos) una vez han sido asignados por el regulador. Nuestro objetivo principal es analizar las consecuencias de la existencia de este mercado competitivo puesto que aumenta el conjunto de estrategias de las empresas. Desde un punto de vista teórico, caracterizamos las condiciones bajo las cuales el mercado mejora (o empeora) a las empresas con respecto a la situación sin mercado de derechos.

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File URL: http://eprints.ucm.es/9925/1/WP02-08.pdf
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Paper provided by Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales in its series Working Papers del Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales with number 02-08.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ucm:wpaper:02-08
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