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Comparative statics for a three player differential game in resource economics - the case of exhaustible resources and varying allocations of initial stocks

  • Petra Huck


    (Environmental Economics and Agricultural Policy Group, Technical University of Munich)

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    Differential games combine strategic interactions between agents and optimization concerning time. Decisions made in the past determine the present and even the future .in pay off as well as in the opportunities available . for oneself and for the rival players, eventually too. Unfortunately, due to high complexity it is hard to find a Nash-equilibrium within a differential game and it is even harder to get some results in comparative statics. It is the purpose of the paper at hand to present findings concerning comparative statics in a differential game discussed by Wacker and Blank (1999). Comparative statics become available due to a routine solving for the open-loop Nash equilibrium for each parameter combination under consideration. A description of the routine . a 4 step simulation run which approximates the equilibrium numerically . was presented in an earlier Working Paper. In the earlier Paper Excel was applied as it is a wild spread tool. Here again Excel, its Solver and Macros constitute the main instruments; they are used to get repeated simulation runs for varying parameter constellations. The findings presented here concern varying allocations in initial stocks. Generalization to comparative statics in further parameters is in progress.

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    Paper provided by Technische Universität München, Environmental Economics and Agricultural Policy Group in its series Discussion Papers with number 052005.

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    Length: 23 pages
    Date of creation: May 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:tuu:papers:052005
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