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Three-Candidate Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Stochastic Voting

  • Evrenk, Haldun

    ()

    (Suffolk University, Economics)

  • Kha, Dmitriy

    ()

    (Suffolk University, Economics)

We study the effects of stochastic (probabilistic) voting on equilibrium locations, equilibrium vote shares and comparative statics in a setup with three heterogenous candidates and a single-dimensional issue space. Comparing the equilibria with and without stochastic voting, we find that under an appropriate level of uncertainty about voter behavior, the model has a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) that is free from several non-plausible features of the PSNE under deterministic voting. The results are robust to extensions to asymmetric density and plurality maximization.

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File URL: http://192.138.214.118/RePEc/docs/wpaper/2010-2.pdf
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Paper provided by Suffolk University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2010-2.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 02 Feb 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:suf:wpaper:2010-2
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.suffolk.edu/college/2175.html

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