IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/suf/wpaper/2008-3.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Game-Theoretic Explanation for the Persistence of Political Corruption

Author

Listed:
  • Evrenk, Haldun

    () (Suffolk University, Department of Economics)

Abstract

Using a theoretical model of two-candidate competition, I study the political support for a fully effective and costless reform targeting high level political corruption. I find that when the candidates have a high discount factor, and when the level of political corruption is not too low, both corrupt and honest candidates have incentives to oppose the reform. I also find that a fully informed and fully coordinated electorate can change a candidate's incentives by bundling the reform with high wages and by voting strategically.

Suggested Citation

  • Evrenk, Haldun, 2008. "A Game-Theoretic Explanation for the Persistence of Political Corruption," Working Papers 2008-3, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:suf:wpaper:2008-3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://192.138.214.118/RePEc/docs/wpaper/2008-3.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    2. Caselli, Francesco & Morelli, Massimo, 2004. "Bad politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 759-782.
    3. repec:cup:apsrev:v:85:y:1991:i:02:p:371-392_17 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Evrenk, Haldun, 2008. "Mackerels in the Moonlight: A Duopoly Model of Political Agency," Working Papers 2008-4, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Evrenk, Haldun, 2008. "Mackerels in the Moonlight: A Duopoly Model of Political Agency," Working Papers 2008-4, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
    2. Evrenk, Haldun, 2008. "On the (In)Effectiveness of Some Commonly Proposed Anti-Corruption Reforms," Working Papers 2008-5, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political Corruption; Political Economy of Anti-Corruption Reform;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:suf:wpaper:2008-3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Frank Conte). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/edsufus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.