IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/spo/wpmain/infohdl2441-hqvfahst79ekpe0losvq1h46k.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Guillaume Plantin

    (Département d'économie)

Abstract

Banks are subject to capital requirements because their privately optimal leverage is higher than the socially optimal one. This is in turn because banks fail to internalize all costs that their insolvency creates for agents who use their money-like liabilities to settle transactions. If banks can bypass capital regulation in an opaque shadow banking sector, it may be optimal to relax capital requirements so that liquidity dries up in the shadow banking sector. Tightening capital requirements may spur a surge in shadow banking activity that leads to an overall larger risk on the money-like liabilities of the formal and shadow banking institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillaume Plantin, 2015. "Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/hqvfahst79e, Sciences Po.
    • Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/hqvfahst79ekpe0losvq1h46k
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/hqvfahst79ekpe0losvq1h46k/resources/2015-plantin-shadow-banking-and-bank-capital-v-ed.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2013. "A Model of Shadow Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(4), pages 1331-1363, August.
    2. Acharya, Viral V. & Schnabl, Philipp & Suarez, Gustavo, 2013. "Securitization without risk transfer," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(3), pages 515-536.
    3. Miller, Merton H., 1986. "Financial Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(4), pages 459-471, December.
    4. Guillermo Ordoñez, 2018. "Sustainable Shadow Banking," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 33-56, January.
    5. Kane, Edward J, 1988. "Interaction of Financial and Regulatory Innovation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 328-334, May.
    6. Chao Gu & Fabrizio Mattesini & Randall Wright, 2013. "Banking: A New Monetarist Approach," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(2), pages 636-662.
    7. Bank for International Settlements, 2013. "Asset encumbrance, financial reform and the demand for collateral assets," CGFS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 49, december.
    8. Patrick Bolton & Tano Santos & Jose A. Scheinkman, 2011. "Outside and Inside Liquidity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(1), pages 259-321.
    9. Silber, William L, 1983. "The Process of Financial Innovation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 89-95, May.
    10. Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, 2012. "Shadow Banking Regulation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 99-140, October.
    11. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, 2010. "Regulating the Shadow Banking System," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 41(2 (Fall)), pages 261-312.
    12. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    13. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
    14. Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, 2010. "When Safe Proved Risky: Commercial Paper during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(1), pages 29-50, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Guillaume Plantin, 2015. "Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation," SciencePo Working papers hal-01168494, HAL.
    2. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/hqvfahst79ekpe0losvq1h46k is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Guillaume Plantin, 2015. "Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01168494, HAL.
    4. Daniel Covitz & Nellie Liang & Tobias Adrian, 2015. "Financial Stability Monitoring," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 357-395, December.
    5. Luck, Stephan & Schempp, Paul, 2014. "Banks, shadow banking, and fragility," Working Paper Series 1726, European Central Bank.
    6. Demyanyk, Yuliya & Loutskina, Elena, 2016. "Mortgage companies and regulatory arbitrage," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 328-351.
    7. Saki Bigio & Adrien d'Avernas, 2021. "Financial Risk Capacity," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 142-181, October.
    8. Gebauer Stefan, 2021. "Welfare-Based Optimal Macroprudential Policy with Shadow Banks," Working papers 817, Banque de France.
    9. Ordoñez, Guillermo, 2018. "Confidence banking and strategic default," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 101-113.
    10. Carlos Arteta & Mark Carey & Ricardo Correa & Jason Kotter, 2020. "Revenge of the Steamroller: ABCP as a Window on Risk Choices," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 24(3), pages 497-528.
    11. Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, 2012. "Shadow Banking Regulation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 99-140, October.
    12. Emmanuel Farhi & Jean Tirole, 2021. "Shadow Banking and the Four Pillars of Traditional Financial Intermediation [Securitization without Risk Transfer]," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 88(6), pages 2622-2653.
    13. Bouwman, Christa H. S., 2013. "Liquidity: How Banks Create It and How It Should Be Regulated," Working Papers 13-32, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    14. Carmela D’Avino, 2020. "Global Banking and Macroprudential Policy: New Evidence on U.S. Banks," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(4), pages 1095-1121, October.
    15. Kuncl, Martin, 2019. "Securitization under asymmetric information over the business cycle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 237-256.
    16. Majid Haghani Rizi & N. Kundan Kishor & Hardik A. Marfatia, 2019. "The dynamic relationship among the money market mutual funds, the commercial paper market, and the repo market," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(5), pages 395-414, March.
    17. Chen, Jiakai, 2022. "Market discipline and regulatory arbitrage: Evidence from ABCP liquidity guarantors," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    18. Huang, Ji, 2018. "Banking and shadow banking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 124-152.
    19. Adrian, Tobias & Breuer, Peter & Ashcraft, Adam & Cetorelli, Nicola, 2018. "A Review of Shadow Banking," CEPR Discussion Papers 13363, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Tao Sun, 2015. "The Impact of Global Liquidity on Financial Landscapes and Risks in the ASEAN-5 Countries," IMF Working Papers 2015/211, International Monetary Fund.
    21. Eduardo Dávila & Ansgar Walther, 2021. "Corrective Regulation with Imperfect Instruments," NBER Working Papers 29160, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Shadow banking activity; Banking system; Banking crisis; Unregulated Banking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/hqvfahst79ekpe0losvq1h46k. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Spire @ Sciences Po Library (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ecspofr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.