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Faillite souveraine, négociation privée et nouvelle architecture financière internationale

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  • Jérôme Sgard

    (Centre de recherches internationales)

Abstract

Le Fonds monétaire international, les ministres des Finances du G7, les milieux financiers privés et les cercles académiques ont été agités au cours des deux dernières années par un débat feutré mais très vigoureux : fallait-il adopter la proposition formulée en novembre 2001 par Anne Krueger, la numéro deux du Fonds, de créer un tribunal de faillite pour les États souverains ? Ou était-il préférable de s’en tenir à une règle de coordination plus légère définie par les seuls acteurs privés ? Ou bien encore, troisième option, était-il plus simple de continuer de traiter le problème de manière pragmatique et improvisée, au cas par cas, comme on l’a fait ces dernières années ? (...).

Suggested Citation

  • Jérôme Sgard, 2003. "Faillite souveraine, négociation privée et nouvelle architecture financière internationale," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/8283, Sciences Po.
  • Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/8283
    as

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    File URL: https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/8283/resources/jsgard-2004ch6.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marcus H. Miller, 2002. "Sovereign Debt Restructuring: New Articles, New Contracts--Or No Change?," Policy Briefs PB02-03, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
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