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Une (ré) assurance chômage européenne

Author

Listed:
  • Léo Aparisi de Lannoy
  • Xavier Ragot

    (Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques)

Abstract

Le retour de la croissance ne peut faire oublier la mauvaise gestion de la crise au niveau européen sous son aspect économique, mais aussi social et politique. Les divergences des taux de chômage, des balances courantes et des dettes publiques entre les pays de la zone euro sont inédites depuis des décennies. Les évolutions de la gouvernance européenne doivent viser la plus grande efficacité économique pour la réduction du chômage et des inégalités tout en explicitant et en justifiant leurs enjeux financiers et politiques afin de les rendre compatibles avec des choix politiques nationaux. La constitution d'une assurance chômage européenne remplit ces critères. L'idée d'un mécanisme européen d'indemnisation des chômeurs est une vielle idée dont les premières traces remontent au moins à 1975. Cette idée est aujourd'hui très débattue en Europe avec des propositions émanant d'économistes ou d'administrations italiennes, françaises, des études menées par des instituts allemands, dont ce texte propose une synthèse. Cette possibilité est même évoquée dans des communications de la Commission européenne. Cette note présente les débats européens, ainsi que le système en place aux États-Unis. Le mécanisme de réassurance chômage européen présenté dans cette note vise à financer les indemnités chômage des pays en cas de récession sévère et s'inspire pour cela de l'expérience des États-Unis. Ce mécanisme constitue un second niveau européen en plus de niveaux nationaux d'assurance chômage différents. Il permet de soutenir les chômeurs dans les pays touchés par une récession importante, ce qui contribue à soutenir la demande agrégée et l'activité tout en réduisant les inégalités dans les pays bénéficiaires, et est compatible avec une réduction des dettes publiques. Ce mécanisme n'engendre ni transferts permanents vers les pays qui ne se réformeraient pas, ni de distorsions de concurrence, ni le transfert de pouvoirs politiques relevant aujourd'hui de la subsidiarité. Il est en effet, comme c'est le cas aux États-Unis, compatible avec une hétérogénéité de systèmes nationaux. Pour donner des ordres de grandeur, un système de réassurance, équilibré sur le cycle économique européen et sans transferts permanents entre les pays, aurait augmenté la croissance de 1,6 % du PIB en Espagne au cœur de la crise, et l'Allemagne aurait reçu une aide européenne de 1996 à 1998 et de 2003 à 2005. La France aurait connu une augmentation du PIB de 0,8 % en 2013 grâce à un tel système, comme le montrent des simulations présentées par des équipes européennes.

Suggested Citation

  • Léo Aparisi de Lannoy & Xavier Ragot, 2017. "Une (ré) assurance chômage européenne," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/5i0jcpu6sk9, Sciences Po.
  • Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/5i0jcpu6sk96cpn76n8q0ie20c
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Assurance chômage; Europe;

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