IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/snu/ioerwp/no23.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Youngsub Chun

    ()

Abstract

We investigate the implications of converse consistency in the context of bargaining. A solution is conversely consistent if whenever for some problem, a feasible alternative has the property that for all proper subgroups of the agents it involves, the solution chooses the restriction of the alternative to the subgroup for the associated reduced problem this subgroup faces, then the alternative should be the solution outcome for the problem. We present two alternative characterizations of the egalitarian solution based on converse consistency as well as either weak consistency or population monotonicity, in addition to other standard axioms of weak Pareto optimality, symmetry, and continuity. However, if we strengthen weak Pareto optimality to Pareto opti-mality, then various impossibility results are obtained. On the other hand, by weakening converse consistency to weak converse consistency, which applies the hypotheses of converse consistency only to the problem whose solution outcome is smooth, we can recover both Pareto optimality and scale invari-ance. In fact, we obtain a characterization of the Nash solution based on restricted converse consistency, as well as other axioms of Pareto optimality, symmetry, scale invariance, continuity, and dummy.

Suggested Citation

  • Youngsub Chun, 1999. "The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining," Working Paper Series no23, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
  • Handle: RePEc:snu:ioerwp:no23
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://econ.snu.ac.kr/~ecores/activity/paper/no23.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Youngsub Chun, 2001. "The Replacement Principle in Bargaining," Working Paper Series no42, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining problem; converse consistency; egalitarian solution; restricted converse consistency; Nash solution;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:snu:ioerwp:no23. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Seo seung-Hee). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/iesnukr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.