Market Competition, Plan Constraints, and Asset Diversion in the Enterprise Groups in China
An increasing number of Chinese companies are now taking the form of the enterprise groups. The enterprise groups often develop in China when the parent companies set up subsidiaries to enter into new profitable business areas. We interpret this phenomenon as a response to increasing market competition given the still plan-contrained environment such that exit from the old business fields is not easy due to institutional constraints, including social functions attached to the old businesses, such as job provisions. In this case, entry or expansion into new business fields is often accompanied by implicit or explicit asset diversion from the parent companies to new spin-off firms. This asset diversion tends to lead to the creation of hybrid parent companies characterized by low long-term investment ratio and low weight of business income of the parent companies relative to that of the whole group. Whereas this way of group formation by spin-offs can be considered as a'bottom-up' or voluntary response, grouping by the government-initiated M&A and state holding companies is more 'top-down' and seem to be less viable forms.
|Date of creation:||Jul 1999|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: San 56-1, Silim-dong, Kwanak-gu, Seoul 151-742|
Web page: http://econ.snu.ac.kr/~ecores/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Leff, Nathaniel H, 1978. "Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in the Developing Countries: The Economic Groups," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(4), pages 661-675, July.
- Lee, Keun & Mark, Shelley, 1991. "Privatization in China's industry," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 157-173.
- Lee, Keun, 1993. "Property Rights and the Agency Problem in China's Enterprise Reform," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 179-194, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:snu:ioerwp:no20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Seo seung-Hee)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.