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Agreement, Separability, and Other Axioms for Quasi-Linear Social Choice Problems

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  • Youngsub Chun


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    A quasi-linear social choice problem is concerned with choosing one among a finite set of public projects and determining side payments among agents to cover the cost of the project, assuming each agent has quasi-linear preferences. We first investigate the logical relations between various axioms in this context. They are: agreement, separability, population solidarity, consistency, converse consistency, and population-and-cost solidarity. Also, on the basis of these axioms, we present alternative characterizations of egalitarian solutions; each solution assigns to each agent an equal share of the surplus derived from the public project over some reference utility level.

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    Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University in its series Working Paper Series with number no19.

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    Date of creation: Jun 1999
    Handle: RePEc:snu:ioerwp:no19
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