IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Power of An Outside Option that Generates a Focal Point: An Experimental Investigation

  • Quazi Shahriar


    (Department of Economics, San Diego State University)

Registered author(s):

    Existing experimental studies have shown that an outside option, when offered to one of the two players who later participate in a battle-of-the-sexes game, facilitates coordination by making the equilibrium that favors the same player focal. Since the other player’s payoff in the outside option was lower than that in the focal point, it is possible that there was a reciprocal motive of the other player to coordinate on the focal point. Then it is possible that the actual power of the outside option to generate the focal point was either lower or non-existent. The current paper reports results of an experiment designed to test for the focal point effect of the outside option by controlling for the reciprocal motive of the other player. The results confirm that the outside option can generate the focal point even when the reciprocal motive is absent. In fact, the saliency of the focal point is higher after controlling for reciprocity.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by San Diego State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0035.

    in new window

    Length: 8 pages
    Date of creation: Oct 2009
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:sds:wpaper:0035
    Contact details of provider: Postal: 5500 Campanile Drive, San Diego, CA 92182-4485
    Phone: (619) 594-1675
    Fax: (619) 594-5062
    Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sds:wpaper:0035. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ginger Shoulders)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.