The Production Franchise: An Unstable Organizational Choice
In this paper some determinants of discrete shifts from production franchise agreements to vertical integration are investigated from a new angle. Production franxhise agreements are considered as an organizational innovation for the diffusion of process and/or product innovations. A common agency model describes production franchising as a contractual device between agent (the production franchisor) ans multiple principals (the production franchisees) that operate on an exclusive segment of a given territory. The boundaries of the franchisenetwork are obtained as a non-cooperative solution. Sufficient conditions are obtained for the profitability of franchising production and or the reduction of the degree of appropriability of innovation benefits by industrial franchisors. This offers a new theoretical explanation for observed business practices.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||Oct 1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: School of Economics and Finance, University of St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9AL|
Phone: 01334 462420
Fax: 01334 462438
Web page: http://crieff.wordpress.com/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:san:crieff:9913. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (the School of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.