Risk Management in Venture Capital Investor-Investee Relations
This paper provides an empirical analysis of risk handling arrangements adopted in the relationship between the venture capital investor and his investee. The theoretical framework adopted is principal-agent analysis, which views the investee as a risk averse agent entering into a risk sharing contract with the investor, a risk neutral (fully diversified) principal. The sample analysed is made up of twenty venture capital investors in the UK over the period 1992-93, and (where available) their corresponding investee(s). These investors accounted for about three quarters of venture capital activity in the UK over this period. The paper reports on evidence gathered by semi-structured interviews with investors and investees, on expected returns, portfolio balance, screening and risk sharing.
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