A Constitution for Privatized Eastern Enterprise
Western advisors of Eastern reform favour outside, stock-market ownership and control of large privatized enterprise. However, Japanese firms and their Western transplants are dominated by employee stakeholders as implicit residual owners. Their success, and political contraints, suggest a majority equity stake for (often-entrenched) Eastern empoloyees, closely linked to bank creditors with majority board membership and remaining equity. Residual-claimant status removes the incentive for redistributive wage claims (that have decimated East German employment) and maximises motivation for cooperative effort, supported by relational banking for efficient intervention, investment, control and restructuring in case of default.
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