The Scope of Chadwick's Bidding Scheme
In this paper, I examine the scope of Chadwick's principle of contract management. I show that Chadwick targeted his bidding scheme at a number of social evils he perceived to be attached to unregulated cpmpetition and not just at decreasing-cost natural monopoly. I also show that his scheme requires a tax to be added in any application involving increasing costs. It may then be a useful form of regulation, depending upon the costs and benefits of contract management.
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