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Do fiscal variables affect fiscal expectations? Experiments with real world and lab data

  • Oliver Kirchkamp
  • Michele Bernasconi
  • Paolo Paruolo

We generate observable expectations about fiscal variables through laboratory experiments using real world data from several European countries as stimuli. We compare a VAR model of expectations for data which is presented in a fiscal frame with one for neutrally presented data. We find that participants understand the meaning of the fiscal variables, but also that their ability to perceive the correct characteristics of fiscal policy is limited. We tie the VAR analysis to specific models of forming expectations. We find that agents’ expectations are neither consistent with rational nor with purely adaptive expectations but, instead, follow an augmented-adaptive scheme

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Paper provided by Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm in its series CRIEFF Discussion Papers with number 0608.

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Date of creation: Jun 2006
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Handle: RePEc:san:crieff:0608
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