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Deficits, Coalition Effects and the Timing of Decisions

  • Gerald Pech

This paper develops an intertemporal model of legislative bargaining in the presence of distorting redistributive instruments. It includes negotiations in the cabinet and in the parliament that acts with or without coalitional discipline. We focus on the comparison of outcomes with negotiations on a debt target prior to tax spending decisions to outcomes where the level of debt is renegotiated. In the cabinet, a switch to targeting procedures allows for local improvements in debt policies. In the parliament with lack of coalitional discipline targeting results in a materially balanced budget.

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Paper provided by Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm in its series CRIEFF Discussion Papers with number 0023.

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Date of creation: Feb 2000
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Handle: RePEc:san:crieff:0023
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  1. Helpman Elhanan & Persson Torsten, 2001. "Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-33, November.
  2. Mark Hallerberg & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 209-232 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Persson, Torsten & Roland , Gérard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Seminar Papers 633, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  4. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-71, October.
  5. Alberto Alesina & Ricardo Hausmann & Rudolf Hommes & Ernesto Stein, 1996. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America," NBER Working Papers 5586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," Scholarly Articles 3612769, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  7. Gerald Pech, 2004. "Coalition Governments Versus Minority Governments: Bargaining Power, Cohesion and Budgeting Outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 1-24, October.
  8. Nouriel Roubini & Jeffrey Sachs, 1988. "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the IndustrialDemocracies," NBER Working Papers 2682, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Persson, Torsten, 1998. "Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 310-27, March.
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