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Demographic Structure and the Security of Property Rights in Developing Countries – An Empirical Exploration

  • Philipp Harms
  • Philipp an de Meulen

    ()

It is often argued that countries with a high population share of children and young workers should attract large capital inflows from aging industrialized economies. However, many of these countries deter foreign investors by a high risk of creeping or outright expropriation. In this paper we explore whether the correlation between countries’ demographic structure and the perceived security of property rights reflects a causal relationship. We show that, once we control for other potential determinants of expropriation risk, the ratio of young to old workers has a positive effect on the perceived security of property rights in low-income countries. This effect is the stronger the more democratic the political system.

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Paper provided by Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen in its series Ruhr Economic Papers with number 0229.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:rwi:repape:0229
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