Financing Social Security by Taxing Capital Income – A Bad Idea?
This paper examines the growth effects of an increase of capital income taxes with additional revenue being devoted to cut wage-related social security contributions to reduce unemployment. The analysis is carried out in an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth, unemployment and a social security system comprising pensions and unemployment benefits. It is shown that the reform not only promotes employment but may additionally stimulate economic growth. Calibrating the model to match data for the EU15 reveals that European countries can indeed gain in form of higher employment and growth if the initial capital income tax is not too high.
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- Caballe, Jordi, 1998. "Growth Effects of Taxation under Altruism and Low Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(446), pages 92-104, January.
- Michael Bräuninger, 2005.
"Social Security, Unemployment, and Growth,"
International Tax and Public Finance,
Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 423-434, August.
- Chamley, Christophe, 1986. "Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 607-22, May.
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