Host Country’s Governance and the Size of Foreign Investors
This paper tests whether smaller foreign investors are more sensitive to the quality of host country’s governance than larger investors. This may be the case as smaller foreign firms have less bargaining power, undertake more innovative activities and/or are more sensitive to uncertainty and risk. The results lend support to the hypothesis.
|Date of creation:||May 2007|
|Date of revision:|
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