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Segregation and Strategic Neighborhood Interaction

  • Jason Barr

    ()

  • Troy Tassier

    ()

We introduce social interactions into the Schelling model of residential choice. These social interactions take the form of a Prisoner's Dilemma game played with neighbors. First, we study the Schelling model over a wide range of utility functions and then proceed to study a spatial Prisoner's Dilemma model. These models provide a benchmark for studying a combined model with preferences over like-typed neighbors and payoffs in the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma game. We study this combined model both analytically and using agent-based simulations. We find that the presence of these additional social interactions may increase or decrease segregation compared to the standard Schelling model. If the social interactions result in cooperation then segregation is reduced, otherwise it is increased.

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File URL: http://www.ncas.rutgers.edu/workingpaper20071
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark in its series Working Papers Rutgers University, Newark with number 2007-001.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:run:wpaper:2007-001
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Web page: http://www.ncas.rutgers.edu/economics

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  1. David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser, 1995. "Are Ghettos Good or Bad?," NBER Working Papers 5163, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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