Segregation and Strategic Neighborhood Interaction
We introduce social interactions into the Schelling model of residential choice. These social interactions take the form of a Prisoner's Dilemma game played with neighbors. First, we study the Schelling model over a wide range of utility functions and then proceed to study a spatial Prisoner's Dilemma model. These models provide a benchmark for studying a combined model with preferences over like-typed neighbors and payoffs in the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma game. We study this combined model both analytically and using agent-based simulations. We find that the presence of these additional social interactions may increase or decrease segregation compared to the standard Schelling model. If the social interactions result in cooperation then segregation is reduced, otherwise it is increased.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 360 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Blvd., Newark, NJ 07102|
Phone: (973) 353-5259
Web page: http://www.ncas.rutgers.edu/economics
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser, 1997. "Are Ghettos Good or Bad?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 827-872.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:run:wpaper:2007-001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vlad Manole)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.