Dynamic Advertising with Spillovers: Cartel vs Competitive Fringe
A differential oligopoly game with advertising is investigated, where different dynamics occur between two groups of agents, the former playing a competitive Nash game and the latter cooperating as a cartel. Sufficient conditions for stability and a qualitative analysis of the profit ratio and social welfare at equilibrium are provided. A threshold value for the size of the competitive fringe is pointed out by a suitable numerical simulation.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2007|
|Date of revision:||Jul 2007|
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- R. Cellini & L. Lambertini & G. Leitmann, 2005. "Degenerate Feedback and Time Consistency in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 535, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2002. "Advertising with Spillover Effects in a Differential Oligopoly Game With Differentiated Goods," Working Papers 430, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Gustav Feichtinger & Richard F. Hartl & Suresh P. Sethi, 1994. "Dynamic Optimal Control Models in Advertising: Recent Developments," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(2), pages 195-226, February.
- Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521816632, 1.
- R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2001. "Advertising in a Differential Oligopoly Game," Working Papers 427, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919, 1.
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