Just One Of Us: Consumers Playing Oligopoly In Mixed Markets
Consumer cooperatives constitute a highly successful example of democratic forms of enterprises operating in developed countries. They are usually organized as medium and large-scale ?rms competing with pro?t-maximizing ?rms in retail industries. This paper models such situation as a mixed oligopoly in which consumer cooperatives maximize the utility of consumer-members and distribute them a share of the pro?t equal to the ratio of their individual expenditure to the ?rm total sales. We show that when consumers possess quasilinear preferences over a bundle of symmetrically di¤erentiated goods and ?rms operate with a linear technology, the presence of consumer cooperatives a¤ects all industries output and social welfare positively. The e¤ect of cooperatives on welfare proves more signi?cant when goods are either complements or highly di¤erentiated and when competition is à la Cournot rather than à la Bertrand.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Date of revision:||2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Via Ostiense, 161, 00154 ROMA|
Web page: http://host.uniroma3.it/centri/crei/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Cremer, Helmuth & Marchand, Maurice & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1989.
"The Public Firm as an Instrument for Regulating an Oligopolistic Market,"
Oxford Economic Papers,
Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 283-301, April.
- CREMER, Helmuth & MARCHAND, Maurice & THISSE, Jacques-François, "undated". "The public firm as an instrument for regulating an oligopolistic market," CORE Discussion Papers RP 832, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Cremer, H. & Marchand, M. & Thisse, J.-F., 1987. "The public firm as an instrument for regulating an oligopolistic market," CORE Discussion Papers 1987010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Goering, Gregory E., 2008. "Welfare impacts of a non-profit firm in mixed commercial markets," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 326-334, December.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Cooperatives vs. outside ownership," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19360, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership," ESE Discussion Papers 114, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 346, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1816, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership," NBER Working Papers 6421, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- David Kelsey & Frank Milne, 2008. "Imperfect Competition and Corporate Governance," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(6), pages 1115-1141, December.
- Frank Milne & David Kelsey, 2006. "Imperfect Competition and Corporate Governance," Working Papers 1079, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1996. "The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 53-69, Winter.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1996. "The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Co-operatives Versus Outside Ownership," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /1996/292, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Frank Milne & David Kelsey, 2006. "Takeovers and Cooperatives," Working Papers 1113, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
- Hamilton, J.H. & Slutsky, S.M., 1988. "Endogenous Timing In Duopoly Games: Stackelberg Or Cournot Equilibria," Papers 88-4, Florida - College of Business Administration.
- Mikami, Kazuhiko, 2003. "Market power and the form of enterprise: capitalist firms, worker-owned firms and consumer cooperatives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 533-552, December.
- Fulton, Murray E., 1989. "Cooperatives in Oligopolistic Industries: The Western Canadian Fertilizer Industry," Journal of Agricultural Cooperation, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, vol. 4.
- Albaek, Svend & Schultz, Christian, 1998. "On the relative advantage of cooperatives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 397-401, June.
- Svend Albæk & Christian Schultz, 1998. "On the relative advantage of cooperatives," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Marco Marini & Alberto Zevi, 2010. "Consumer Cooperatives and Welfare in a Mixed Oligopoly," Working Papers 1010, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini, revised 2010.
- de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1989. "Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 302-311, April.
- repec:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:33:p:06 is not listed on IDEAS
- Tennbakk, Berit, 1992. "The Case of Cooperative Mixed Duopoly," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt8wp406w7, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
- Farrell, Joseph, 1985. "Owner-consumers and efficiency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 303-306.
- Joseph Farrell, 1985. "Owner-Consumers and Efficiency," Working papers 380, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October.
- Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Cremer, Jacques, 1992. "Duopoly with employee-controlled and profit-maximizing firms: Bertrand vs Cournot competition," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 241-258, June.
- Corneo, Giacomo G., 1997. "Taxpayer-consumers and public pricing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 235-240, December.
- David Kelsey & Frank Milne, 2010. "Takeovers and cooperatives: governance and stability in non-corporate firms," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 99(3), pages 193-209, April.
- Mikami, Kazuhiko, 2010. "Capital procurement of a consumer cooperative: Role of the membership market," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 178-197, June.
- Murray Fulton & Konstantinos Giannakas, 2001. "Organizational Commitment in a Mixed Oligopoly: Agricultural Cooperatives and Investor-Owned Firms," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1258-1265.
- V. James Rhodes, 1983. "The Large Agricultural Cooperative as a Competitor," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 65(5), pages 1090-1095.
- de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1990. " Game Theoretic Models of Mixed Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17.
- Pennerstorfer, Dieter & Weiss, Christoph R., 2007. "Do Cooperatives Offer High Quality Products?," 103rd Seminar, April 23-25, 2007, Barcelona, Spain 9403, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Peter J. LAW & Geoff STEWART, 1983. "Stackelberg Duopoly with an Illyrian and Profit-Maximising Firm," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1983026, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Arthur L. Bekenstein, 1943. "A Theoretical Analysis of Consumer Co-Operatives: The Managerial Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51, pages 251-251. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)