Alliances and Negotiations
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- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2009. "Alliances and negotiations: an incomplete information example," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(3), pages 195-203, September.
- Philip Bond & Hülya Eraslan, 2010.
"Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals,"
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"Group Decision-Making and Voting in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study,"
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- Daniel Cardona & Clara Ponsatí, 2015. "Representing a democratic constituency in negotiations: delegation versus ratification," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 399-414, September.
More about this item
KeywordsAlliances; Multiperson bargaining;
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
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