The Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers: A Survey
This paper surveys the literature on the price effects of horizontal mergers. The majority of mergers that have been examined in the nine studies conducted over the past 22 years resulted in increased prices for both the merging parties and rival firms, at least in the short run. There is some evidence that product prices increase after mergers are announced but before they are consummated.
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- Eckbo, B Espen & Wier, Peggy, 1985. "Antimerger Policy under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: A Reexamination of the Market Power Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 119-49, April.
- Stillman, Robert, 1983. "Examining antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 225-240, April.
- Mitchell, Mark L. & Mulherin, J. Harold, 1996. "The impact of industry shocks on takeover and restructuring activity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 193-229, June.
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