Is force ever justified in preventing a State from acquiring nuclear weapons?
In order to provide a grounded argument, the present paper asks the following questions. Why do States acquire nuclear weapons? Why do finally States tend to prevent this acquisition? What does the use of force imply? This logical structure adduces the argument sustaining the avoidance of the use of force as a viable preventive tool. It concentrates exclusively on States instituting a threat and on the force-led circumventive strategies’ implications used by non-threatening States to prevent acquisition. Through first, stressing the security model it emphasise the security-stability reasons for which countries are willing to acquire the nuclear weapon. However, secondly it punctuates the tangible side effects faced by this model. Therefore, it highlights the move towards the vicious-circle logic. Owing this vicious-circle logic, prevention must be advocated. Nonetheless, the third part evidences, via the building of my inferential model (confere Figure 1, p.8), the fact that any prevention based on the use of force must be refrained on account of its consequences - it nourishes the vicious-circle logic.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2010|
|Date of revision:|
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