IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Combining Top-down and Bottom-up Accountability: Evidence from a Bribery Experiment

  • Danila Serra

Monitoring corruption typically relies on top-down interventions aimed at increasing the probability of external controls and the severity of punishment.� An alternative approach to fighting corruption is to induce bottom-up pressure for reform.� Recent studies have shown that both top-down and bottom-up mechanisms are rarely able to keep service providers accountable.� This paper investigates the effectiveness of an accountability system that combines bottom-up monitoring and top-down auditing using data from a specifically designed bribery lab experiment.� We compare "public officials" tendency to ask for bribes under: 1) no monitoring; 2) conventional top-down auditing, and 3) an accountability system which gives citizens the possibility to report corrupt officials, knowing that reports lead to formal punishment with some low probability (the same as in 2).� The experimental results suggest that "combined" accountability systems can be highly effective in curbing corruption, even when citizens' "voice" leads to formal punishment with a relatively low probability.� In contrast, pure top-down auditing may prove ineffective, especially in a weak institutional environment.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2008-25text.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number WPS/2008-25.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:wps/2008-25
Contact details of provider: Postal: Manor Rd. Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ
Web page: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:wps/2008-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Caroline Wise)

The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Caroline Wise to update the entry or send us the correct address

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.