The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment
Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect.� When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered.� Higher negative externalities are also associated with less bribe acceptance.� However, framing has no effect on bribe acceptance, suggesting that the issue of artificiality first raised by Bardsley (2005) may be of particular importance in bribery experiments.
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- Klaus Abbink & Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke Renner, 2002.
"An Experimental Bribery Game,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 428-454, October.
- Abbink, Klaus & Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke Renner, 1999. "An Experimental Bribery Game," Discussion Paper Serie B 459, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Klaus Abbink & Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke Renner, 2000. "An Experimental Bribery Game," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1389, Econometric Society.
- Volodymyr Bilotkach, 2006. "A Tax Evasion - Bribery Game: Experimental Evidence from Ukraine," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 3(1), pages 31-49, June.
- Klaus Abbink, 2000. "Fair Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse1_2000, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 1996. "Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 181-191, October.
- Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2002.
"Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment,"
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
bgse23_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2006. "Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 103-121, June.
- L. Cameron & A. Chaudhuri & N. Erkal & L. Gangadharan, 2005. "Do Attitudes Towards Corruption Differ Across Cultures? Experimental Evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia andSingapore," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 943, The University of Melbourne.
- Klaus Abbink, 2006. "Laboratory experiments on corruption," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-38, Monash University, Department of Economics.
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