A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions
We propose a new, easy-to-implement, class of payment rules, "Reference Rules", to make core-selecting package auctions more robust.� Small, almost-riskless, profitable deviations from "truthful bidding" are often easy�for bidders to find under currently-used payment rules.� Reference Rules perform better than existing rules on our marginal-incentive-to-deviate criterion, and are as robust as existing rules to large deviations.� Other considerations, including fairness and comprehensibility, also support the use of Reference Rules.
|Date of creation:||01 Nov 2009|
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