Patent Licensing from High-Cost Firm to Low-Cost Firm
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References listed on IDEAS
- Choi, Jay Pil, 2001. "Technology transfer with moral hazard," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 249-266, January.
- Nancy T. Gallini & Brian D. Wright, 1990. "Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 147-160, Spring.
- Kamien, Morton I., 1992. "Patent licensing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 331-354 Elsevier.
- Caves, Richard E & Crookell, Harold & Killing, J Peter, 1983. "The Imperfect Market for Technology Licenses," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 45(3), pages 249-267, August.
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- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2007:i:3:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
- Mukherjee, Arijit, 2010.
"Licensing a new product: Fee vs. royalty licensing with unionized labor market,"
Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 735-742, August.
- Arijit Mukherjee, "undated". "Licensing a new product: Fee vs. royalty licensing with unionized labor market," Discussion Papers 07/03, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
- Arijit Mukherjee & Yingyi Tsai, 2013. "Technology licensing under optimal tax policy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 108(3), pages 231-247, April.
- Arijit Mukherjee, "undated". "Technology licensing under convex costs," Discussion Papers 10/05, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
- Bagchi, Aniruddha & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2014.
"Technology licensing in a differentiated oligopoly,"
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- Aniruddha Bagchi & Arijit Mukherjee, "undated". "Technology licensing in a differentiated oligopoly," Discussion Papers 10/16, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
More about this item
Keywordslicensing; fixed fee; royalty; two-part tariff; quantity competition; Innovation;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-04-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2005-04-03 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2005-04-03 (Innovation)
- NEP-MIC-2005-04-03 (Microeconomics)
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