The Role of Fixed Fee and Royalty in Patent Licensing
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordslicensing; fixed fee; royalty; adverse selection;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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