“They do know what they are doing... at least most of them.” Asymmetric Information in the (private) Disability Insurance
In this paper we analyze asymmetric information in the (private) disability insurance, which has not been analyzed before in the literature, but covers one of the most important risks faced by individuals in modern society, namely the loss of human capital. We show that there is asymmetric information, but the extent depends on the amount of coverage. Moreover, the option of choosing an annual adjustment of the insured sum has strong predictive power both for the occurrence of an accident and the chosen coverage, although it should be irrelevant from the point of theory. This result shows new ways to design contracts and variable selection for risk classification. In contrast to most previous studies, we also explicitly take into consideration unobserved heterogeneity by applying finite mixture models and so called ‘unused’ observables.
|Date of creation:||24 May 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.mea.mpisoc.mpg.de/
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Marc Henry & Yuichi Kitamura & Bernard Salanie, 2010.
"Identifying Finite Mixtures in Econometric Models,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1767, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2013.
- Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
- Dionne, G. & Doherty, N. & Fombaron, N., 2000.
"Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets,"
Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-
00-05, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
- Spindler, Martin & Winter, Joachim & Hagmayer, Steffen, 2012.
"Asymmetric Information in the Market for Automobile Insurance: Evidence from Germany,"
MEA discussion paper series
12259, Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy.
- Martin Spindler & Joachim Winter & Steffen Hagmayer, 2014. "Asymmetric Information in the Market for Automobile Insurance: Evidence From Germany," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 81(4), pages 781-801, December.
- Gourieroux, Christian & Monfort, Alain & Renault, Eric & Trognon, Alain, 1987. "Generalised residuals," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-2), pages 5-32.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1997.
"Moral Hazard and Observability,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1205, David K. Levine.
- Bettina Grün & Friedrich Leisch, . "FlexMix Version 2: Finite Mixtures with Concomitant Variables and Varying and Constant Parameters," Journal of Statistical Software, American Statistical Association, vol. 28(i04).
- Pierre‐André Chiappori & Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2006.
"Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 37(4), pages 783-798, December.
- Pierre-André Chiappori & Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2002. "Asymmetric Information in Insurance : General Testable Implications," Working Papers 2002-42, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Liangjun Su & Martin Spindler, 2013. "Nonparametric Testing for Asymmetric Information," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(2), pages 208-225, April.
- De Meza, D. & Webb, D.C., 2000.
"Advantageous Selection in Insurance Market,"
0007, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, 2014.
"Testing for Asymmetric Information Using “Unused Observables” in Insurance Markets: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market,"
Journal of Risk & Insurance,
The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 81(4), pages 709-734, December.
- Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, 2006. "Testing for Asymmetric Information Using 'Unused Observables' in Insurance Markets: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market," NBER Working Papers 12112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2009.
"Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets,"
NBER Working Papers
15586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2010. "Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 39-84.
- Shavell, Steven, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 541-62, November.
- Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
- Li Gan & Feng Huang & Adalbert Mayer, 2011. "A Simple Test of Private Information in the Insurance Markets with Heterogeneous Insurance Demand," NBER Working Papers 16738, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mea:meawpa:12260. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Henning Frankenberger)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.